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ImmPulse Weekly

Reporting Period | November 10-14, 2025

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Media Commentary & Policy Reflections

Post-secondary schools brace for more pain as Ottawa cuts international student visas

Ottawa’s new immigration levels plan will roughly halve new study permits next year (to about 155,000), deepening the financial squeeze on colleges and universities that already rely heavily on international tuition. Ontario colleges alone expect up to $2.5 billion in lost revenue, thousands of jobs and hundreds of programs already cut, even as governments pitch an “International Talent Attraction Strategy” to fast-track PhD researchers and exempt most master’s/PhD students from the cap, and aim to reduce overall temporary residents to 5% of Canada’s population by 2027.

(Toronto Star)

An economist at Capital Economics warns that the Carney government’s budget plan to cut temporary residents (workers and students) to 5% of the population by 2027, including sharp reductions in work permits and roughly halving study permits through 2028, could flatten population growth and drag on GDP and rental construction, even as it eases youth job competition and some rent pressure. RBC notes the shift is smaller than last year’s overhaul and that one-time pathways from temporary to permanent status will soften the economic hit from slower population growth.

(Toronto Star)

Carney’s minority Liberals, backed by the NDP and Greens, have pushed Bill C-3 through third reading in its original form, undoing Conservative and Bloc amendments that would have added language tests, knowledge requirements and extra security checks for foreign-born descendants. The bill, now headed to the Senate, would let Canadians born abroad pass citizenship to children born overseas if they can show 1,095 days of physical presence in Canada, aiming to fix the “Lost Canadian” problem and comply with a court ruling that found the current second-generation cut-off unconstitutional; the government has asked the court for a six-month extension beyond the November 20, 2025 deadline to get the new law in place.

(Toronto Star)

Program Delivery & Immigration Highlights

On November 14, 2025, Ontario paused its Express Entry: Skilled Trades Stream after finding widespread misrepresentation and fraud in how people were meeting eligibility rules. All pending Skilled Trades applications will be returned with full fee refunds, and candidates who still qualify can submit a new Expression of Interest under other OINP streams for future draws.

(Source)

As of November 14, 2025, the Northwest Territories Nominee Program has closed its 2025 intake after reaching its 300-nomination cap for the Employer-Driven and Francophone Streams; applications received will either be assessed or withdrawn and the program is expected to reopen in 2026. Employers and workers can still look to the NWT Business Stream, as well as federal options like the Temporary Foreign Worker Program and Francophone Mobility Program, to address labour needs in the meantime.

(Source)

IRCC has updated its study-permit instructions to confirm that protected persons and their family members can apply for a study permit from inside Canada after they enter, whether or not they’ve applied for permanent residence, slightly expanding and clarifying in-Canada eligibility for this group.

(Source)

IRCC has updated the Year 2 instructions for the Francophone Minority Communities Student Pilot. As of September 1, the financial requirements for this pilot will rise in line with the new 2025 low-income cut-offs (LICO), matching the higher proof-of-funds threshold for other study permit applicants.

(Source)

IRCC has updated its IMP instructions for post-secondary co-op work permits (C32): students in eligible co-op programs can now work up to 24 hours per week off campus (previously 20), modestly increasing allowable off-campus work while studying.

(Source)

IRCC has extended its special measures for people affected by the conflict in Sudan to October 28, 2026: Sudanese nationals and eligible family members already in Canada can keep extending or changing their temporary status without paying fees, and Sudanese nationals abroad who are ready to be issued a PR visa remain exempt from the usual passport/travel document requirement (though travel-document fee waivers for Canadians/PRs have ended).

(Source)

IRCC has quietly tightened and clarified rules for open work permits issued to family members of foreign military personnel. Dependent children are no longer eligible for OWPs on cases received on/after January 21, 2025 under admin codes C46/C48, and spouses of TEER 4 workers are not eligible under C47; IRCC has also added clearer guidance on what evidence officers should look for, and how to document approvals and refusals, in non-reciprocal C20/C41 cases.

(Source)

On November 9, 2025, the federal government unveiled Canada’s new Climate Competitiveness Strategy, an economy-wide plan to keep Canada competitive in a low-carbon world by strengthening industrial carbon pricing, clarifying greenhouse-gas regulations, rolling out clean-investment tax credits, backing critical-minerals and clean-power projects, and using tools like the Canada Growth Fund to de-risk private investment. The pitch is that climate action and economic growth now go hand-in-hand: Canada wants to attract global capital, create good jobs, and reduce climate-related economic risks while staying a G7 leader on clean energy and emissions reduction.

(Source)

Recent Case Law

Issue: Whether it was reasonable for a visa officer to refuse a TRV and impose a five-year misrepresentation bar under s. 40(1)–(2) IRPA because the applicant answered “No” to the question asking if he had ever been refused a visa or denied entry, despite a prior prudential revocation of a U.S. student visa.

Facts:

  • Mr. Issa, a Lebanese citizen, applied in January 2024 for a Canadian TRV to visit his brother.
  • On the form, question 2(b) asked whether he had ever been refused a visa or denied entry to Canada or any other country; he answered “No”.
  • A procedural fairness letter alleged incomplete disclosure of previous visa refusals. In response, he explained that:
    • His U.S. F-1 visa had been prudentially revoked in 2013 by the U.S. State Department based on information that came to light after issuance;
    • He had been asked to bring his passport for physical cancellation;
    • He understood this as a revocation, not a refusal, and maintained that he had never been refused a visa.
  • The officer refused the TRV and found misrepresentation under s. 40(1)(a), imposing a five-year bar.

 

Court Findings:

  • The Court reviewed the misrepresentation framework, emphasizing that:
    • Misrepresentation requires withholding material facts that could induce an error;
    • The provision is interpreted broadly, but there is a narrow exception where the applicant honestly and reasonably believed they were not withholding material information.
  • Duchesne J. relied on the jurisprudence summarized in Munoz Gallardo and related cases (Kazzi, Oloumi, Goburdhun, Medel) to frame the ten principles guiding misrepresentation analysis, including the heavy onus on applicants to be candid, but also the possibility of a narrow good-faith exception.
  • On the facts, the Court found the decision unreasonable because:
    • The officer treated a U.S. prudential revocation as functionally equivalent to a visa refusal without adequate explanation;
    • The evidence showed the U.S. visa had been validly issued and later revoked for prudential reasons, which is not obviously the same as being “refused a visa”;
    • The officer failed to meaningfully engage with the applicant’s explanation and supporting documentation about the nature of the U.S. action.
  • The Court accepted that, on this record, Mr. Issa could honestly and reasonably have believed that a prudential revocation was not a “refusal” and that he was not withholding material information.

 

Outcome:

  • Application for judicial review allowed; the misrepresentation finding and refusal were quashed and remitted to a different officer for redetermination.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Clarifies that foreign actions like prudential revocations are not automatically equivalent to “visa refusals” for purposes of the generic refusal question on IRCC forms.
  • Re-emphasizes that misrepresentation under s. 40 requires a careful materiality analysis and consideration of good-faith misunderstandings, not a rote “any discrepancy equals misrep” approach.
  • Helpful authority for challenging aggressive misrepresentation findings where applicants disclose nuanced foreign immigration histories but officers oversimplify them.

Issue: Whether an officer’s refusal of an Authorization to Return to Canada (ARC) for a foreign national with a history of removal, non-compliance, and criminality was reasonable and procedurally fair.

Facts:

  • Mr. Bathia, a citizen of India, had previously been removed from Canada following serious immigration non-compliance and criminal convictions.
  • He applied for an ARC to re-enter Canada.
  • The officer concluded that:
    • His prior conduct—multiple removals/non-compliance events and criminality—demonstrated a persistent disregard for Canadian immigration law;
    • The passage of time and claimed rehabilitation did not outweigh the risk of future non-compliance.
  • The application for judicial review argued that the decision was unreasonable and failed to properly weigh positive factors or apply the ARC guidance.

 

Court Findings:

  • The Court applied the reasonableness standard and reviewed the ARC framework, including the factors from Jesurum (nature of the original inadmissibility, subsequent conduct, risk of re-offending, and compelling reasons to return).
  • Diner J. held that:
    • The officer’s focus on the applicant’s pattern of non-compliance and criminal record was consistent with the policy and case law;
    • The officer was entitled to give limited weight to uncorroborated assertions of rehabilitation and generalized hardship in India;
    • The reasons showed a rational weighing of relevant factors and were intelligible and transparent.
  • No procedural unfairness was found; the applicant had an opportunity to present his case and there was no duty to provide further disclosure or oral hearing in an ARC context.

 

Outcome:

  • Application for judicial review dismissed; ARC refusal upheld.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Confirms that ARC decisions attract deference and that officers may legitimately give heavy weight to past non-compliance and criminality, even where some time has passed.

 

Reinforces Jesurum as the governing framework and signals that applicants must provide compelling evidence of rehabilitation and compelling reasons to return to shift the balance.

Issue: Whether the Minister’s refusal of ministerial relief under s. 42.1(1) IRPA for a former KGB officer found inadmissible under s. 35(1)(b) (security/human rights violations) was reasonable, particularly in the assessment of risk and the balancing of positive and negative factors.

Facts:

  • Mr. Popov, a Russian national, was found inadmissible to Canada for past service with the KGB, engaging s. 35(1)(b) IRPA.
  • He sought ministerial relief under s. 42.1(1), arguing:
    • He joined the KGB as a young man under systemic pressure;
    • He was never involved in human rights abuses;
    • He had long since left the organization and lived a law-abiding life in Canada.
  • The Minister refused relief, emphasizing:
    • The KGB’s documented record;
    • Ongoing concerns about Russia and intelligence activities;
    • A continuing risk.

 

Court Findings:

  • The Court reviewed the ministerial relief framework with reference to Al Yamani and related jurisprudence, noting that:
    • Relief decisions must weigh the nature/seriousness of past conduct against present/future risk and humanitarian considerations;
    • The Minister must grapple with the individual circumstances rather than rely solely on organizational profiles.
  • Fuhrer J. found the decision unreasonable because:
    • The analysis conflated Mr. Popov’s individual risk with generalized concerns about the KGB and the Russian state;
    • There was inadequate engagement with evidence of his specific role, lack of involvement in abuses, passage of time, and positive establishment in Canada;
    • The reasons did not show a meaningful weighing of mitigating factors against the abstract risk narrative.

 

Outcome:

  • Application for judicial review allowed; ministerial relief refusal quashed and remitted for redetermination by a different decision-maker.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Significant for s. 35 ministerial relief: it insists on an individualized assessment of risk and culpability and not just reliance on the notoriety of an organization.

 

Useful precedent for former state-security officials and similar applicants where the Minister has treated membership alone as determinative.

Issue: Whether IRCC’s pace of processing a TRV application made under the “Temporary public policy to facilitate temporary resident visas for certain extended family affected by the crisis in Gaza” justified an order of mandamus compelling processing within a fixed timeline.

Facts:

  • The applicant is a Palestinian man living in the Gaza Strip, applying for a TRV under the Gaza temporary public policy (the “Policy”) amid the ongoing humanitarian crisis and closure of the Rafah crossing.
  • He sought mandamus, alleging IRCC had failed to process his application in a “sufficiently timely” manner in light of the crisis and the Policy’s humanitarian objectives.
  • The Policy contains specific eligibility conditions and documentation requirements; IRCC argued that:
    • The file remained in process;
    • Operational constraints in Gaza and security checks affected timelines;
    • Not all Policy conditions had been clearly met.

 

Court Findings:

  • Brown J. reiterated the Federal Court of Appeal’s binding jurisprudence that mandamus requires a clear right to the performance of a public legal duty, including that all statutory/policy requirements have been met.
  • The Court accepted the severe humanitarian context but held that:
    • The Policy is not an open-ended humanitarian discretion; it sets specific eligibility criteria which must be satisfied before there is any “entitlement” to issuance or prioritized processing;
    • On the record, it was not established that the applicant clearly met all Policy requirements;
    • IRCC’s ongoing processing in a complex operational context did not amount to an unlawful delay justifying mandamus.

 

Outcome:

  • Mandamus application dismissed.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • One of the key “Gaza Policy” cases; it stresses that even in a humanitarian crisis, mandamus only lies where the applicant clearly meets all eligibility requirements.

 

Shows the Court’s reluctance to micro-manage IRCC’s processing timelines in complex operational theatres, while still recognizing the gravity of the situation in Gaza.

Issue: Whether a Palestinian family in Gaza could obtain mandamus compelling IRCC to process their TRV applications under the Gaza temporary public policy within 15 days, on the basis of delay and the humanitarian crisis.

Facts:

  • The applicants are a Palestinian family in the Gaza Strip who applied for TRVs under the same Gaza Policy.
  • They sought an order of mandamus requiring the Minister to process their TRVs within 15 days of judgment.
  • The family invoked the dire humanitarian context, the closure of Rafah and reference to the earlier A.B. 2025 FC 1514 decision.

 

Court Findings:

  • Brown J. reiterated that, under binding Federal Court of Appeal case law, mandamus requires that the applicant already meets all legal requirements for the benefit sought.
  • While expressing strong sympathy for the family and acknowledging the extreme conditions in Gaza, the Court held that:
    • The Gaza Policy sets substantive conditions for eligibility, and the Court was not satisfied on the record that all conditions were clearly met;
    • IRCC’s actions did not demonstrate an abdication of duty or such delay as to become unlawful in the circumstances;
    • Mandamus cannot be used to shortcut or override eligibility assessments under a public policy.

 

Outcome:

  • Application for judicial review and request for mandamus dismissed.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Companion to A.B. 2025 FC 1813 and A.A. 2025 FC 1812; consolidates the Court’s approach to Gaza-Policy mandamus claims.
  • Emphasizes that humanitarian urgency alone does not create a “clear right” to mandamus; the Policy remains a gate-keeping instrument with defined criteria.

Issue: Again, whether applicants in Gaza under the TRV Policy could obtain mandamus compelling IRCC to process their TRVs on an expedited timeline, in light of alleged unreasonable delay and the crisis context.

Facts:

  • This case involves another group of Palestinian family members in Gaza under the same Policy.
  • They alleged that processing delay, given the life-threatening conditions in Gaza, justified mandamus.
  • The record and reasoning closely track those in A.B. 1813 and A.A. 1811; Brown J. expressly links all three as a “trilogy”.

 

Court Findings:

  • The Court applied the same mandamus test and approach as in A.B. 1813 and A.A. 1811.
  • Key conclusions:
    • No clear entitlement to the requested outcome had been demonstrated because eligibility under the Policy was not yet fully established;
    • IRCC’s pace, while slow from the applicants’ perspective and occurring in a tragic context, did not amount to a failure to perform a legal duty;
    • The Court’s role is not to provide case-by-case operational directions to IRCC on how quickly to process files within a public policy framework.

 

Outcome:

  • Judicial review and request for mandamus dismissed.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Third “Gaza mandamus” decision issued the same day; together, the trilogy forms a clear line that:
    • Mandamus is unavailable where IRCC is still assessing eligibility under a complex temporary public policy;

 

The Court will not transform humanitarian policies into enforceable rights to issuance or guaranteed expedition.

Issue: Whether the Immigration Appeal Division’s dismissal of an appeal against an exclusion order (arising from misrepresentation) was reasonable.

Facts:

  • Mr. Maan was the subject of an exclusion order and appealed to the IAD.
  • The IAD upheld the exclusion order, finding:
    • Misrepresentation was established;
    • There were insufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations to justify special relief.
  • On judicial review, he challenged the IAD’s assessment of both the misrepresentation and the H&C balancing.

 

Court Findings:

  • Roy J. applied reasonableness review and held that:
    • The IAD reasonably accepted the underlying misrepresentation finding;
    • The H&C analysis adequately considered factors such as establishment in Canada, family hardship, and the seriousness of the misconduct;
    • The reasons met the Vavilov standard, they were internally coherent and grounded in the record.

 

Outcome:

  • Judicial review dismissed; exclusion order stands.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Reinforces the high deference given to IAD decisions in removal-order appeals, particularly where misrepresentation is serious.

 

Highlights the Court’s expectation that H&C analyses in the enforcement context will be respected if the Member touches the main relevant factors and explains the balance struck.

Issue: Whether the refusal of a spousal sponsorship application based on concerns about the genuineness of the relationship was reasonable.

Facts:

  • Mr. Maan sponsored his spouse for PR; the application was refused on the basis that the marriage was not found to be genuine or not primarily entered into for immigration purposes.
  • The record included:
    • Limited cohabitation;
    • Inconsistencies and gaps in the evidence of ongoing contact and support;
    • Concerns about timing and circumstances of the marriage.
  • He challenged the officer’s assessment as unreasonable.

 

Court Findings:

  • Roy J. held that:
    • The genuineness assessment is highly fact-driven and owed deference;
    • The officer’s reasons identified concrete evidentiary gaps and contradictions, not just stereotypes or speculation;
    • The decision met the Vavilov requirements of justification and intelligibility in light of the evidence; the Court would not re-weigh the relationship evidence.

 

Outcome:

  • Judicial review dismissed; refusal of the spousal sponsorship upheld.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Another reminder that Federal Court will rarely interfere with genuineness findings where officers clearly point to evidence-based concerns.

 

Useful to contrast with cases where relationship refusals are set aside for being rooted in cultural stereotyping or inadequate reasoning.

Issue: Whether the IAD breached procedural fairness by refusing to adjourn a residency-obligation appeal so that counsel could attend, and whether the refusal to adjourn and proceed without counsel rendered the decision unreasonable.

Facts:

  • Mr. Mahmood, a PR since 2002, lived frequently in Pakistan. A visa officer found he was ~90 days short of the 730-day residency requirement when he applied for a PR travel document.
  • He appealed to the IAD. After ADR, he realized the case was complex and retained counsel. Counsel:
    • Requested a new hearing date due to time needed to prepare; the Minister did not oppose;
    • Later clarified he was also unavailable on the scheduled date and provided alternate dates.
  • A coordinating member refused the postponement, calling the case “straightforward” and suggesting there was enough time to prepare.
  • At the hearing, Mr. Mahmood again sought adjournment; the Minister again did not oppose, but the IAD member refused and proceeded.
  • During the hearing, the Minister relied on ICES traveller-history data, disputing not just ~90 days but suggesting a breach of over 300 days; this raised new issues of credibility and evidentiary complexity that Mahmood struggled to understand or address without counsel.

 

Court Findings:

  • Sadrehashemi J. held that refusing a postponement so an individual can be represented by counsel is reviewable where the case is complex, consequences serious, and the person lacks the resources to properly represent themselves.
  • The Court found:
    • This case was not “straightforward” – it involved a shifting calculation of days (from ~90 to >300) and credibility issues, plus an H&C assessment;
    • Mr. Mahmood clearly did not fully understand the significance of the ICES evidence or the main issues (he even failed to address the core H&C question in closing);
    • The Member failed to consider key Rule 91 factors: lack of prejudice to the Minister (who did not oppose adjournment), timeliness of the request, counsel’s unavailability, and that this was a first adjournment request.
  • The Court concluded that the denial of the adjournment breached procedural fairness and was unreasonable.

 

Outcome:

  • Judicial review allowed; IAD decision quashed and remitted to a different decision-maker for redetermination.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Strong authority on adjournments and the right to counsel in residency-obligation appeals, especially where the factual matrix becomes more complex mid-hearing.

 

Helpful precedent for arguing that “straightforward” labels cannot be used to justify forcing self-representation when serious status consequences are at stake and counsel is ready but unavailable.

Issue: Whether a study-permit refusal based on an inconsistent study plan and lack of clear career path was reasonable, and whether the officer’s use of Chinook 3+ undermined the decision.

Facts:

  • Ms. Juárez, a Mexican citizen aged 30, holds:
    • A bachelor’s degree in special education; and
    • A second bachelor’s in commerce and international trade; she works in logistics.
  • She was accepted into a two-year college diploma in personal fitness training at Mount Royal University and applied for a study permit.
  • The officer refused, finding she would not leave Canada because her study plan:
    • Was inconsistent with her academic/work history;
    • Did not outline a clear career path;
    • Did not explain why she would pursue a lower-level diploma at significant expense despite already holding two degrees.
  • On JR, she argued:
    • The officer unreasonably discounted the benefits of the program and her detailed business plan;
    • The use of Chinook 3+ suggested a cursory, automated decision and a failure to consider evidence.

 

Court Findings:

  • Grammond J. restated that the Court’s role is not to reweigh evidence but to assess reasonableness; officers may reasonably ask what benefit a proposed program provides to the applicant.
  • The Court held:
    • Her motivation letter contained only two short, vague paragraphs on benefits and future plans (passion for fitness, better quality program in Canada, intention to open a gym with her father), with no actual business plan in the record despite counsel’s claim.
    • The officer could reasonably find that her explanation did not show a “clear career path” and that moving from two degrees to a college diploma in a new field was not a clearly justified progression on this record.
  • On Chinook:
    • The Court reiterated that use of Chinook 3+ is not inherently unreasonable or unfair;
    • The shared timestamp between GCMS reasons and the Chinook notation did not prove a lack of real review; the presumption that the officer considered all evidence was not rebutted.

 

Outcome:

  • Leave granted; judicial review dismissed; study-permit refusal upheld.

 

Why This Case is Important:

  • Part of the Study Permit Pilot line of decisions, reinforcing that:
    • Officers may focus heavily on study-plan coherence and “reasonable progression”;
    • Vague statements about passion or future plans, without concrete evidence, are usually insufficient.

 

It also continues the line of authority holding that Chinook 3+ use, by itself, does not demonstrate unreasonableness or breach of procedural fairness.

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